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Abstract
The full-information model was introduced by Ben-Or and Linial in 1985 to study collective
coin-flipping: the problem of generating a common bounded-bias bit in a network of n players
with t = t(n) faults. They showed that the majority protocol, in which each player sends a
random bit and the output is the majority of the players’ bits, can tolerate t(n) = O(
√
n)
even in the presence of adaptive corruptions, and they conjectured that this is optimal for such
adversaries. Lichtenstein, Linial, and Saks proved that the conjecture holds for protocols in
which each player sends only a single bit. Their result has been the main progress on the
conjecture during the last 30 years.
In this work we revisit this question and ask: what about protocols where players can send
longer messages? Can increased communication allow for a larger fraction of corrupt players?
We introduce a model of strong adaptive corruptions, in which an adversary sees all messages
sent by honest parties in any given round and, based on the message content, decides whether
to corrupt a party (and alter its message or sabotage its delivery) or not. This is in contrast
to the (classical) adaptive adversary who can corrupt parties only based on past messages, and
cannot alter messages already sent.
We prove that any one-round coin-flipping protocol, regardless of message length, can be
secure against at most O˜(
√
n) strong adaptive corruptions. Thus, increased message length
does not help in this setting.
We then shed light on the connection between adaptive and strongly adaptive adversaries,
by proving that for any symmetric one-round coin-flipping protocol secure against t adaptive
corruptions, there is a symmetric one-round coin-flipping protocol secure against t strongly
adaptive corruptions. Going back to the standard adaptive model, we can now prove that
any symmetric one-round protocol with arbitrarily long messages can tolerate at most O˜(
√
n)
adaptive corruptions.
At the heart of our results there is a novel use of the Minimax Theorem and a new technique
for converting any one-round secure protocol with arbitrarily long messages into a secure one
where each player sends only polylog(n) bits. This technique may be of independent interest.
1 Introduction
A collective coin-flipping protocol is one where a set of n players use private randomness to generate
a common random bit b. Several protocol models have been studied in the literature. In this
work, we focus on the model of full information [BL85] where all parties communicate via a single
broadcast channel.
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The challenge is that t = t(n) of the parties may be corrupted and aim to bias the protocol
outcome (i.e. the “coin”) in a particular direction. We focus on Byzantine faults, where once a party
is corrupted, the adversary completely controls the party and can send any message on its behalf.
Two types of Byzantine adversaries have been considered in the literature: static adversaries and
adaptive adversaries. A static adversary is one that chooses which t players to corrupt before the
protocol begins. An adaptive adversary is one who may choose which t players to corrupt adaptively,
as the protocol progresses.
Collective coin-flipping in the case of static adversaries is well understood (see section 1.2). In
this work, our focus is on the setting of adaptive adversaries, which has received considerably less
attention. A collective coin-flipping protocol is said to be secure against t adaptive (resp. static)
corruptions if for any adaptive adversary corrupting t parties, there is a constant ε > 0 such that
the probability that the protocol outputs 0 (and the probability that the protocol outputs 1) is at
least ε, where the probability is taken over the randomness of the players and the adversary.
The question we study is: What is the maximum number of adaptive corruptions that a secure
coin-flipping protocol can tolerate? On the positive side, it has been shown by Ben-Or and Linial
[BL85] in 1985 that the majority protocol (where each party sends a random bit, and the output
is equal to the majority of the bits sent), is resilient to Θ(
√
n) adaptive corruptions. Ben-Or and
Linial conjectured that this is in fact optimal.
Conjecture 1.1 ([BL85]). Majority is the optimal coin-flipping protocol against adaptive adver-
saries. In particular, any coin-flipping protocol is resilient to at most O(
√
n) adaptive corruptions.
Shortly thereafter, Lichtenstein, Linial, and Saks [LLS89] proved the conjecture for a restricted
class of protocols: namely, those in which each player sends only a single bit. Their result has been
the main progress on the conjecture of [BL85] during the last 30 years.
1.1 Our contribution
We first define a new adversarial model of strong adaptive corruptions. Informally, an adversary
is strongly adaptive if he can corrupt players depending on the content of their messages. More
precisely, in each round, he can see all the messages that honest players “would” send, and then
decide which of them to corrupt. This is in contrast to a (traditionally defined) adaptive adversary
who can, at any point in the protocol, corrupt any player who has not yet spoken based on the
history of communication, but cannot alter the message of a player who has already spoken. Thus,
strong adaptive adversaries are more powerful than adaptive adversaries.
We believe that the notion of strong adaptive security gives rise to a natural and interesting
new adversarial model in which to study multi-party protocols in general. Indeed, it is a realistic
concern in many settings that malicious parties may decide to stop or alter messages sent by honest
players depending on message content, and it is a shortcoming that existing adversarial models fail
to take such behavior into account.
We consider our strong adaptive adversarial notion to be closely tied to the notion of a rushing
adversary in the setting of static corruptions. A rushing static adversary can see the messages that
the honest players send in each round, before deciding the messages that the corrupted players will
send in the same round. The intuitive idea of a rushing adversary is that the adversary sees all
possible information in each round, before making his move. We remark that a notion of “rushing
adaptive adversary” has been previously proposed in the literature, but such an adversary is weaker
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than our strong adaptive adversary1. We argue that our strong adaptive adversary better captures
the idea that the adversary sees all possibly relevant information in each round, before making his
move, since in the adaptive setting, the adversary’s strategy must decide not only what messages
to send, but also which players to corrupt.
Our main result is that the conjecture of [BL85] holds (up to polylogarithmic factors) for any
one-round coin-flipping protocol in the presence of strong adaptive corruptions.
Theorem. Any secure one-round coin-flipping protocol Π can tolerate at most t = O˜(
√
n) strong
adaptive corruptions.
This is shown by a generic reduction of communication in the protocol: first, we prove that any
strongly adaptively secure protocol Π can be converted to one where players send messages of no
more than polylogarithmic length, while preserving the number of corruptions that can be tolerated.
Then, we show that any protocol with messages of polylogarithmic length can be converted to one
where each player sends only a single bit, at the cost of a polylogarithmic factor in the number
of corruptions. Finally, we reach the single-bit setting in which the bound of Lichtenstein et al.
[LLS89] can be applied to obtain the theorem. We believe that our technique of converting any
protocol into one with short messages is of independent interest and will find other applications.
Furthermore, we prove that strongly adaptively secure protocols are a more general class of
protocols than symmetric adaptively secure protocols. A symmetric protocol Π is a one that is
oblivious to the order of its inputs: that is, where for any permutation π : [n]→ [n] of the players,
it holds that the protocol outcome Π(r1, . . . , rn) = Π(rπ(1), . . . , rπ(n)) is the same.
Theorem. For any symmetric one-round coin-flipping protocol Π secure against t = t(n) adaptive
corruptions, there is a symmetric one-round coin-flipping protocol Π′ secure against Ω(t) strong
adaptive corruptions.
Curiously, this proof makes a novel use of the Minimax Theorem [NM44; Nas50] from game
theory, in order to take any symmetric, adaptively secure protocol and convert it to a new protocol
which is strongly adaptively secure. This technique views the protocol as a zero-sum game between
two players A0 and A1, where A0 wins if the protocol outcome is 0 and A1 wins if the outcome is
1. We analyze the “minimax strategy” in which the players try to minimize their maximum loss,
in order to deduce the strong adaptive security of the new protocol. Whereas some prior works
have made use of game theory in the analysis of (two-party) protocols, this is the first use of these
game-theoretic concepts in the construction of distributed multiparty protocols.
Finally, using the above results as stepping stones, we return to the classical conjecture of [BL85],
in the model of adaptive adversaries, and show that the conjecture holds (up to polylogarithmic
factors) for any symmetric one-round protocol with arbitrarily long messages.
Theorem. Any secure symmetric one-round coin-flipping protocol Π can tolerate at most t =
O˜(
√
n) adaptive corruptions.
1In particular, the “rushing adaptive adversary” from the literature can decide the order in which players send
messages in a round, and can decide to corrupt a player who has not yet sent a message within a round. However,
unlike our strong adaptive adversary, this adversary cannot decide to corrupt a player based on the content of the
message which the player would send if uncorrupted.
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1.2 Related work
The full-information model (also known as the perfect information model) was introduced by Ben-
Or and Linial [BL85] to study the problem of collective coin-flipping when no secret communication
is possible between honest players.
In the static setting. Protocols for collective coin-flipping in the presence of static corruptions
have been constructed in a series of works that variously focus on improving the fault-tolerance,
round complexity, and/or bias of the output bit. Feige [Fei99] gave a protocol that is (δ1.65/2)-
secure2 in the presence of t = (1 + δ) · n/2 static corruptions for any constant 0 < δ < 1. Russell,
Saks, and Zuckerman [RSZ02] then showed that any protocol that is secure in the presence of
linearly many corruptions must either have at least (1/2 − o(1)) · log∗(n) rounds, or communicate
many bits per round.
Interestingly, nearly all proposed multi-round protocols for collective coin-flipping first run a
leader election protocol in which one of the n players is selected as a “leader”, who then outputs a
bit that is taken as the protocol outcome. We remark that this approach is inherently unsuitable
for adaptive adversaries, which can always corrupt the leader after he is elected, and thereby surely
control the protocol outcome.
In the adaptive setting. The study of coin-flipping protocols has been predominantly in the
static setting. The problem of adaptively secure coin-flipping was introduced by Ben-Or and Linial
[BL85] and further examined by Lichtenstein, Linial, and Saks [LLS89] as described in the previous
section. In addition, Dodis [Dod00] proved that through “black-box” reductions from non-adaptive
coin-flipping, it is not possible tolerate significantly more corruptions than the majority protocol.
The definition of “black-box” used in [Dod00] is rather restricted: it only considers sequential
composition of non-adaptive coin-flipping protocols, followed by a (non-interactive) function com-
putation on the coin-flips thus obtained.
In the pairwise-channels setting. An adversarial model bearing some resemblance to our
strong adaptive adversary model was introduced and analyzed by Hirt and Zikas [HZ10] in the
pairwise communication channels model, rather than the full-information model. In their model,
the adversary can corrupt a party P based on some of the messages that P sends within a round,
then the adversary controls the rest of P ’s messages in that round (and for future rounds). Unlike
in our strong adaptive model, the adversary of [HZ10] cannot “see inside all players’ heads” and
overwrite arbitrary honest messages based on their content before they are sent.
Interestingly, a separation has been shown between standard adaptive adversaries and the
stronger adversaries of Hirt and Zikas: [HZ10] shows that broadcast is impossible to achieve for
t > n/2 corruptions in their stronger adversarial model, whereas Garay et al. [GKKZ11] showed
that broadcast is achievable for any t < n corruptions in the standard adaptive adversarial model.
In the computational setting. The problem of generating a shared random bit has also been
studied in the setting where players are computationally bounded, and in different communication
2A coin-flipping protocol is ε-secure against t static corruptions if for any static adversary that corrupts up to t
parties, the probability that the protocol outputs 0 is at least ε.
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network models. Blum [Blu81] introduced the coin-flipping problem in the two-player compu-
tational setting; and Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [GMW87] subsequently showed that it is
possible to efficiently generate a shared bit with negligible bias, in the presence of static adversaries.
Another line of work shows that the existence of any coin-flipping protocol for computationally
bounded players which achieves a sufficiently small bias implies the existence of one-way functions.
The latest result in this line of work, due to Berman, Haitner, and Tentes [BHT14], proves that
if there exists a two-player coin-flipping protocol that achieves any constant bias, then one-way
functions exist.
2 Preliminaries
We consider coin-flipping protocols in the full-information model (also known as the perfect infor-
mation model), where n computationally unbounded players communicate via a single broadcast
channel. The network is synchronized between rounds, but is asynchronized within each round
(that is, there is no guarantee on message ordering within a round, and an adversary can see the
messages of all honest players in a round before deciding his own messages).
In this work, we focus on one-round protocols, and we consider protocols that terminate (and
produce an output) with probability 1. In particular, we focus on coin-flipping protocols, which
are defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Coin-flipping protocol). A coin-flipping protocol Π = {Πn}n∈N is a family of
protocols where each Πn is a n-player protocol which outputs a bit in {0, 1}.
Notation. We write
s≈ for statistical indistinguishability of distributions. We denote by PrΠ(b)
the probability that an honest execution of Π will lead to the outcome b ∈ {0, 1}. We denote by
PrΠ,A(b) the probability that an execution of Π in the presence of an adversary A will lead to
the outcome b ∈ {0, 1}. The probability is over the random coins of the honest players and the
adversary.
For one-round protocols, we write Πn(r1, . . . , rn) to denote the outcome of the protocol Πn when
each player i sends message ri. (The vector (r1, . . . , rn) is a protocol transcript.)
2.1 Properties of protocols
Definition 2.2 (Symmetric protocol). A protocol Π is symmetric if the outcome of a protocol
execution is the same no matter how the messages within each round are permuted. In particular,
a one-round protocol Π is symmetric if for all n ∈ N and any permutation π ∈ [n]→ [n],
Πn(r1, . . . , rn) = Πn(rπ(1), . . . , rπ(n)).
We remark, for completeness, that in the multi-round case, the outcome of a symmetric protocol
should be unchanged even if different permutations are applied in different rounds.
Definition 2.3 (Single-bit/multi-bit protocol). A protocol is single-bit if each player sends at most
one bit over the course of the protocol execution. Similarly, a protocol is m-bit if each player sends
at most m bits over the course of the protocol execution. More generally, a protocol which is not
single-bit is called multi-bit.
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Definition 2.4 (Public-coin protocol). A protocol is public-coin if each honest player broadcasts all
of the randomness he generates (i.e. his “local coin-flips”), and does not send any other messages.
2.2 Adversarial models in the literature
The type of adversary that has been by far the most extensively studied in the coin-flipping lit-
erature is the static adversary, which chooses a subset of players to corrupt before the protocol
execution begins, and controls the behavior of the corrupt players arbitrarily throughout the pro-
tocol execution.
A stronger type of adversary is the adaptive adversary, which may choose players to corrupt at
any point during protocol execution, and controls the behavior of the corrupt players arbitrarily
from the moment of corruption until protocol termination.
Definition 2.5 (Adaptive adversary). Within each round, the adversary chooses players one-by-
one to send their messages; and he can perform corruptions at any point during this process.
2.3 Security of coin-flipping protocols
The security of a coin-flipping protocol is usually measured by the extent to which an adversary
can, by corrupting a subset of parties, bias the protocol outcome towards his desired bit.
Definition 2.6 (ε-security). A coin-flipping protocol Π is ε-secure against t = t(n) adaptive (or
static or strong adaptive) corruptions if for all n ∈ N, it holds that for any adaptive (resp. static
or strong adaptive) adversary A that corrupts at most t = t(n) players,
min
(
PrΠn,A(0),PrΠn,A(1)
) ≥ ε.
We remark that this definition of ε-security is sometimes referred to as ε-control or ε-resilience
in other works. We next define a secure protocol to be one with “minimal” security properties
(that is, one where the adversary does not almost always get the outcome he wants).
Definition 2.7 (Security). A coin-flipping protocol is secure against t = t(n) corruptions if it is
ε-secure against t corruptions for some constant 0 < ε < 1.
In this work, we investigate the maximum proportion of adaptive corruptions that can be
tolerated by any secure protocol.
3 Our results
3.1 Strongly adaptive adversaries
In this work, we propose a new, stronger adversarial model than those that have been studied thus
far (see section 2.2), in which the adversary can see all honest players’ messages within any given
round, and subsequently decide which players to corrupt. That is, he can see all the messages that
the honest players “would have sent” in a round, and then selectively intercept and alter these
messages.
Definition 3.1 (Strong adaptive adversary). Within each round, the adversary sees all the mes-
sages that honest players would have sent, then gets to choose which (if any) of those messages to
corrupt (i.e. replace with messages of his choice).
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This notion is an essential tool underlying the proof techniques in our work. Moreover, we
believe that the notion of strong adaptive security gives rise to a natural and interesting new
adversarial model in which to study multi-party protocols, which is of independent interest beyond
the scope of this work.
3.2 Corruption tolerance in secure coin-flipping protocols
Our main contributions consist of the following three results. These can be viewed as partial
progress towards proving the 30-year-old conjecture of [BL85].
Theorem 3.2. Any one-round coin-flipping protocol Π can be secure against at most t = O˜(
√
n)
strong adaptive corruptions.
Theorem 3.3. For any symmetric one-round coin-flipping protocol Π secure against t = t(n)
adaptive corruptions, there is a symmetric one-round coin-flipping protocol Π′ secure against Ω(t)
strong adaptive corruptions.
Corollary 3.4. Any symmetric one-round coin-flipping protocol Π can be secure against at most
t = O˜(
√
n) adaptive corruptions.
In the next sections, we proceed to give detailed proofs of the theorems.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 3.2
We begin by recalling the result of Lichtenstein et al. [LLS89] which proves that the maximum
number of adaptive corruptions for any secure single-bit coin-flipping protocol is O(
√
n). Note that
the majority protocol is the one-round protocol in which each player broadcasts a random bit, and
the majority of broadcasted bits is taken to be the protocol outcome.
Theorem 3.5 ([LLS89]). Any coin-flipping protocol in which each player broadcasts at most one
bit can be secure against at most t = O(
√
n) corruptions. Moreover, the majority protocol achieves
this bound.
Next, we establish some definitions and supporting lemmas.
Definition 3.6 (Distance between message-vectors). For vectors ~r, ~r′ ∈ Mn, let dist(~r, ~r′) be equal
to the number of coordinates i ∈ [n] for which ri 6= r′i.
Definition 3.7 (Robust sets). Let Π be a one-round coin-flipping protocol in which each player
sends a message from a message space M. For any n ∈ N and b ∈ {0, 1}, define the set
RobustΠn(b, t) as follows:
RobustΠn(b, t) =
{
~r ∈ Mn : ∀~r′ ∈ Mn s.t. dist(~r, ~r′) ≤ t, Πn(~r) = Πn(~r′) = b
}
.
Lemma 3.8. Let Π be a one-round coin-flipping protocol in which each player sends a random
message from a message space M. Π is secure against t = t(n) strong adaptive corruptions if and
only if there exists a constant 0 < ε < 1 such that for all n ∈ N and each b ∈ {0, 1},
Pr
~r←M
[
~r ∈ RobustΠn(b, t)] ≥ ε.
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Proof. (“if”) Suppose that there exists a constant 0 < ε < 1 such that for all n ∈ N and all
b ∈ {0, 1}, it holds that
Pr
~r←Mn
[
~r ∈ RobustΠn(b, t)] ≥ ε. (1)
Let A be any strong adaptive adversary making up to t corruptions. For n-vector of (honest)
messages ~r ∈ Mn, let A(~r) ∈ Mn denote the corresponding corrupted message-vector, where up
to t of the messages have been modified by A. By the definition of the set RobustΠn(b, t), it holds
that
Pr
~r←Mn
[
Πn(A(~r)) = b | ~r ∈ RobustΠn(b, t)
]
= 1. (2)
Combining equations (1) and (2), it follows that for each outcome b ∈ {0, 1},
Pr
~r←Mn
[Πn(A (~r)) = b] ≥ ε.
We have shown that for each b ∈ {0, 1}, PrΠ,A(b) ≥ ε, as required.
(“only if”) Suppose, on the other hand, that there is no constant 0 < ε < 1 such that for all
b ∈ {0, 1}, it holds that Pr~r←Mn
[
~r ∈ RobustΠn(b, t)] = ε. That is, there exists some ε′ = o(1) such
that for some b ∈ {0, 1} and infinitely many values of n ∈ N, it holds that
Pr
~r←Mn
[
~r ∈ RobustΠn(b, t)] ≤ ε′. (3)
Without loss of generality, let b = 0 be the bit for which equation (3) holds. By the definition of
RobustΠn(b, t), it holds that for any ~r /∈ RobustΠn(b, t), there exists a vector ~rbad ∈ Mn such that
dist(~r,~rbad) ≤ t and Πn(~r) 6= Πn(~rbad). In other words, if the honest players’ messages ~r do not fall
in RobustΠn(0, t), then it is possible for a strong adaptive adversary A to force the outcome to be
1, by doing as follows:
A(~r) =
{
~r if Πn(~r) = 1
~rbad if Πn(~r) = 0
Note that since dist(~r,~rbad) ≤ t, it is always possible for the adversary to change from ~r to ~rbad using
t or fewer corruptions. Moreover, if Πn(~r) = 0, then it must be that Πn(~rbad) = 1, by construction
of ~rbad. Hence,
Pr
~r←Mn
[
Πn(A(~r)) = 1 | ~r /∈ RobustΠn(0, t)
]
= 1. (4)
Combining equations (3) and (4) (for b = 0), we obtain:
Pr
~r←Mn
[Πn(A(~r)) = 1] = Pr
~r←Mn
[
~r /∈ RobustΠn(0, t)] ≥ 1− ε′.
Hence, PrΠ,A(1) ≥ 1− ε′, and so PrΠ,A(0) ≤ ε′ = o(1). Therefore, Π is not secure against t strong
adaptive corruptions. The lemma follows.
Since players are computationally unbounded and we consider one-round protocols, we may
without loss of generality consider public-coin protocols3: for any one-round protocol Π in the
3This is without loss of generality: each player can simply send his random coin tosses, and security holds since
we are in the full-information model.
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full-information model, there is a protocol Π′ with an identical output distribution (in the presence
of any adversary), in which honest players send random messages in {0, 1}k for some k = poly(n).
The following lemma serves as a stepping-stone to our final theorem.
Lemma 3.9. For any one-round multi-bit coin-flipping protocol Π secure against t = t(n) strong
adaptive corruptions, and any constant δ > 0, there is a one-round ℓ-bit coin-flipping protocol Π′
that is secure against t strong adaptive corruptions, where ℓ = O(log1+δ(n)).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we consider only public-coin protocols, and assume that each
player sends a message of the same length (say, k = k(n) bits). Let δ > 0 be any constant, let
ℓ = O(log1+δ(n)), and let ℓ′ = 2ℓ.
For an ℓ′× n matrix of messages M ∈ ({0, 1}k)ℓ′×n, we define the protocol ΠM as follows: each
player Pi broadcasts a random integer ai ← [ℓ′], and the protocol outcome is defined by
ΠMn (a1, . . . , an) = Πn(M(a1 ,1), . . . ,M(an,n)),
where M(i,j) denotes the message at the i
th row and jth column of the matrix M . For notational
convenience, define ~M(a1, . . . , an) = (M(a1,1), . . . ,M(an,n)). Notice that by construction of the
protocol ΠM , it holds that for any message-vector ~a ∈ [ℓ′]n,
~M(~a) ∈ RobustΠn(b, t) =⇒ ~a ∈ RobustΠMn (b, t). (5)
Suppose each entry of the matrix M is a uniformly random message in {0, 1}k . Note that the
length of each player’s message in ΠM is log(ℓ′) = ℓ. We want to show that ΠM is a secure coin-
flipping protocol against t strong adaptive corruptions, for some M . By Lemma 3.8, it is sufficient
to show that there exists M ∈ ({0, 1}k)ℓ′×n such that for all b ∈ {0, 1},
Pr
~a←[ℓ′]n
[
~a ∈ RobustΠMn (b, t)
]
≥ ε, (6)
where 0 < ε < 1 is constant. Using implication (5), it actually suffices to prove:
∃M ∈ ({0, 1}k)ℓ′×n s.t. ∀b ∈ {0, 1}, Pr
~a←[ℓ′]n
[
~M (~a) ∈ RobustΠn(b, t)
]
≥ ε. (7)
Suppose the matrix M is chosen uniformly at random. Let ~a1, . . . ~an be sampled independently
and uniformly from [ℓ′]n. Since, the number of matrix rows ℓ′ = 2O(log
1+δ(n)) is super-polynomial,
it is overwhelmingly likely that ~a1, . . . ~an will be composed of distinct elements in [ℓ
′]. That is, to
be precise,
Pr
~a1,...,~an
[∀(i, j) 6= (i′, j′) ∈ [n]× [n], (~ai)j 6= (~ai′)j′] ≥ 1− negl(n).
If ~a1, . . . ,~an are indeed composed of distinct elements, the message-vectors ~M(~a1), . . . , ~M (~an) are
independent random elements in ({0, 1}k)n. Thus,
( ~M(~a1), . . . , ~M (~an))
s≈ (~r1, . . . , ~rn), (8)
when M is a random matrix in ({0, 1}k)ℓ′×n, the (short) message-vectors ~a1, . . . ,~an are random in
[ℓ′]n, and the (long) message-vectors ~r1, . . . , ~rn are random in ({0, 1}k)n.
9
Since Π is a secure coin-flipping protocol, there is a constant 0 < ε′ < 1 such that for all n ∈ N
and b ∈ {0, 1} and i ∈ [n],
Pr
~ri
[
~ri ∈ RobustΠn(b, t)
] ≥ ε′.
The rest of the proof follows from a series of Chernoff bounds.
For i ∈ [n] and b ∈ {0, 1}, let Zi,b be an indicator variable for the event that ~ri ∈ RobustΠn(b, t).
Since the ~ri are independent, we apply a Chernoff bound to obtain the following (for all b ∈ {0, 1}):
Pr
~r1,...,~rn
 1
n
·
∑
i∈[n]
Zi,b < ε
′ − ε′′
 ≤ negl(n), (9)
for any constant 0 < ε′′ < ε′.
Let Yi,b be an indicator variable for the event that ~M(~ai) ∈ RobustΠn(b, t). It follows from (8)
and (9) that with overwhelming probability over the choice of the random matrix M , it holds for
all b ∈ {0, 1} that
Pr
~a1,...,~an
 1
n
·
∑
i∈[n]
Yi,b < ε
′ − ε′′
 ≤ negl(n). (10)
For b ∈ {0, 1}, let αb denote the probability Pr~ai
[
~M(~ai) ∈ RobustΠn(b, t)
]
. Note that for any
given b ∈ {0, 1} the variables Yi,b are independently and identically distributed, each taking value
1 with probability αb and value 0 with probability 1− αb. By a Chernoff bound, for any constant
0 < ε′′′ < 1, it holds that (with overwhelming probability over the choice of M):
Pr
~a1,...,~an

∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1n ·
∑
i∈[n]
Yi,b − αb
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε′′′
 ≤ negl(n). (11)
From (10) and (11), it follows that with overwhelming probability over the random choice of M ,
for all b ∈ {0, 1} and any constant 0 < ε′′ < 1 and 0 < ε′′′ < 1,
Pr
~a1,...,~an
[
αb < ε
′ − ε′′ − ε′′′] ≤ negl(n).
By taking ε′′ + ε′′′ ≤ ε′/2, we have that with overwhelming probability over M , it holds that
αb < ε
′/2 for all b ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, the αb correspond exactly to the probability expression in (7),
so we have shown statement (7) as required.
Having reduced the length of players’ messages to polylog(n) in Lemma 3.9, we now prove
the following lemma which reduces the required communication even further, so that each player
sends only one bit. This comes at the cost of a polylogarithmic factor reduction in the number of
corruptions.
Before the lemma, we recall the statement of the Chernoff bound.
Theorem 3.10 (Chernoff bound). Let X1, . . . ,Xn be independent random variables taking values
in {0, 1}, which all have the same expectation µ = E[Xi]. Then, for every 0 < ε < 1,
Pr
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1n ·
∑
i∈[n]
Xi − µ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε
 ≤ 2e−2nε2 .
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Lemma 3.11. For any one-round ℓ-bit coin-flipping protocol Π secure against t = t(n) strong
adaptive corruptions, there is a one-round single-bit coin-flipping protocol Π′ that is secure against
t/ℓ strong adaptive corruptions.
Proof. Let Π be any one-round ℓ-bit coin-flipping protocol secure against t = t(n) strong adaptive
corruptions. We define our new single-bit protocol4 Π′ as follows, for each n ∈ N:
Π′n·ℓ(r1, . . . , rn·ℓ) =
Πn
(
(r1|| . . . ||rℓ), (rℓ+1|| . . . ||r2ℓ), . . . , (r(n−1)·ℓ+1|| . . . ||rn·ℓ)
)
,
where the messages ri ∈ {0, 1} are bits and || denotes concatenation. Informally speaking, there
are n groups of ℓ players in the single-bit protocol Π′n·ℓ, each of which “corresponds to” a single
player in the protocol Πn.
We show that Π′ is secure against t/ℓ corruptions. Let Gi denote the i
th group of ℓ players: to
be precise, Gi = {i · ℓ+ 1, . . . , (i+ 1) · ℓ}. If all of the players in the set Gi are honest, then the ith
“combined message” (ri·ℓ+1|| . . . ||r(i+1)·ℓ) is distributed identically to an honest message of the ith
player in the protocol Πn. By the construction of the protocol Π
′, it follows that for any b ∈ {0, 1}
and n ∈ N,
Pr
~r←{0,1}n·ℓ
[
~r ∈ RobustΠ′n·ℓ(b, t(n))
]
≥ Pr
~r′←({0,1}ℓ)n
[
~r′ ∈ RobustΠn(b, t(n))
]
. (12)
By Lemma 3.8, since Π is secure against t strong adaptive corruptions, there is a constant 0 < ε < 1
such that for all b ∈ {0, 1} and n ∈ N, the right-hand side of inequality (12) is at least ε. Hence we
obtain
Pr
~r←{0,1}n·ℓ
[
~r ∈ RobustΠ′n·ℓ(b, t(n))
]
≥ ε.
It follows (by applying Lemma 3.8 again) that Π′ is secure against t/ℓ strong adaptive corruptions.
Finally, we bring together Lemmas 3.9 and 3.11 to prove the theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Any one-round coin-flipping protocol Π can be secure against at most t = O˜(
√
n)
strong adaptive corruptions.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists a one-round coin-flipping protocol Π which
is secure against t corruptions, where t = ω(
√
n · polylog(n)). Then, by Lemma 3.9, there is an
ℓ-bit one-round coin-flipping protocol Π′ that is secure against t strong adaptive corruptions, where
ℓ = polylog(n). By applying Lemma 3.11 to the protocol Π′, we deduce that there is a single-bit
one-round coin-flipping protocol Π′′ which is secure against t/ℓ = Ω˜(t) strong adaptive corruptions.
Since a strongly adaptive adversary can perfectly simulate any strategy of an adaptive adversary, it
follows that Π′′ is secure against Ω˜(t) adaptive corruptions. Since Π′′ is single-bit, this contradicts
Theorem 3.5.
4We remark that the protocol Π′ that we construct does not strictly adhere to Definition 2.1, because Π′ =
{Πn}n∈ℓ·N does not define an n-player protocol for every n ∈ N. We consider this to be a very minor technical detail
that we bury for clarity of exposition.
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3.4 Proof of Theorem 3.3
In this section, we show that for any symmetric one-round coin-flipping protocol secure against t
adaptive corruptions, there is a one-round coin-flipping protocol secure against Ω(t) corruptions
by strong adaptive adversaries. That is, one-round strong adaptively secure protocols are a more
general class than one-round symmetric, adaptively secure protocols.
Remark. In fact, Theorem 3.3 holds even if the protocol Π is just statically secure: the proof does
not make use of the fact that Π is adaptively, rather than statically, secure. Our theorem statement
refers to Π as an adaptively secure protocol because this is exactly what we need in order to obtain
our final result that any one-round symmetric coin-flipping protocol can be secure against at most
O(
√
n) corruptions.
The Minimax Theorem – a classic tool in game theory – will be an important tool in our proof.
The statement of the Minimax Theorem and supporting game-theoretic definitions are given below.
Definition 3.12 (Two-player strategic game). A two-player finite strategic game Γ = 〈(A1, A2), (u1, u2)〉
is defined by: for each player i ∈ {1, 2}, a non-empty set of possible actions Ai and a utility function
ui : A1 ×A2 → R.
Definition 3.13 (Zero-sum game). A two-player finite strategic game Γ = 〈(A1, A2), (u1, u2)〉 is
zero-sum if for any pair of actions a1 ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2, it holds that u1(a1, a2) + u2(a1, a2) = 0.
Theorem 3.14 (Minimax [NM44; Nas50]). Let Γ = 〈(A1, A2), (u1, u2)〉 be a zero-sum two-player
finite strategic game. Then
max
a2∈∆(A2)
min
a1∈∆(A1)
u2(a1, a2) = min
a1∈∆(A1)
max
a2∈∆(A2)
u1(a1, a2),
where ∆(Ai) denotes the set of distributions over Ai (in game-theoretic terminology, this corre-
sponds to the set of “mixed strategies” for player i.)
Theorem 3.3. For any symmetric one-round coin-flipping protocol Π secure against t = t(n)
adaptive corruptions, there is a symmetric one-round coin-flipping protocol Π′ secure against s =
t/2 strong adaptive corruptions.
Proof. Let Π be a symmetric one-round coin-flipping protocol secure against t = t(n) adaptive
corruptions, and define s(n) = t(n)/2. We define a new protocol Π′ = {Π′n}n∈N as follows:
Π′n(r1, . . . , rn) = min
r′
1
,...,r′s
max
r′′
1
,...,r′′s
Πn+2s
(
r1, . . . , rn, r
′
1, . . . , r
′
s, r
′′
1 , . . . , r
′′
s
)
,
where s = s(n) and honest players in Π′n must send messages according to the same distributions
as in Πn+2s.
Observe that Πn+2s is secure against t(n + 2s(n)) > t(n) corruptions. We show that Π
′
n is
secure against s(n) = t(n)/2 strong adaptive corruptions.
Case 1. Suppose that the adversary aims to bias the outcome towards 0. By the security of
Πn+2s, there is a constant 0 < ε < 1 such that Pr
Πn+2s,A(1) ≥ ε for any adaptive adversary A that
corrupts up to t = 2s players. Without loss of generality (since the protocol is symmetric), suppose
that the adversary corrupts the last 2s players in Πn+2s.
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We say that the honest players’ messages r1, . . . , rn “fix” the outcome of Πn+2s to be 1 if for
any possibly malicious messages rˆ1, . . . , rˆ2s, it holds that Πn+2s(r1, . . . , rn, rˆ1, . . . , rˆ2s) = 1. Then,
with probability at least ε, the honest players’ messages r1, . . . , rn “fix” the outcome of Πn+2s to
be 1. (To see this: suppose not. Then there would exist an adversary which could set the corrupt
messages rˆ1, . . . , rˆ2s so that the protocol outcome is 0 with probability 1− ε. But this cannot be,
since we already established that PrΠn+2s,A(1) ≥ ε.)
Define the set R1
def
= {(r1, . . . , rn) : ∀rˆ1, . . . , rˆ2s, Πn+2s(r1, . . . , rn, rˆ1, . . . , rˆ2s) = 1} to consist of
those honest message-vectors that fix the output of Πn+2s to be 1.
Take any (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ R1. We now show that the outcome of Π′n when the honest players
send messages r1, . . . , rn is equal to 1, even in the presence of a strong adaptive adversary A′ that
corrupts up to s players and aims to bias the outcome towards 0. Without loss of generality,
suppose that A′ corrupts the first s players in Π′n, and replaces their honest messages r1, . . . , rs
with some maliciously chosen messages rˆ1, . . . , rˆs. In this case, the outcome of Π
′
n is
Π′n(rˆ1, . . . , rˆs, rs+1, . . . , rn)
= min
r′
1
,...,r′s
max
r′′
1
,...,r′′s
Πn+2s
(
rˆ1, . . . , rˆs, rs+1, . . . , rn, r
′
1, . . . , r
′
s, r
′′
1 , . . . , r
′′
s
)
≥ min
r′
1
,...,r′s
Πn+2s
(
rˆ1, . . . , rˆs, rs+1, . . . , rn, r
′
1, . . . , r
′
s, r1, . . . , rs
)
= min
r′
1
,...,r′s
Πn+2s
(
r1, . . . , rn, rˆ1, . . . , rˆs, r
′
1, . . . , r
′
s
)
(by symmetry)
= 1,
where the last line follows from the definition of R1, since we started with (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ R1.
We already established that the probability that the honest players’ messages fall in R1 is at
least ε. Thus we deduce that with probability at least ε, the outcome of the new protocol Π′n is
equal to 1, even in the presence of a strong adaptive adversary corrupting s players and aiming to
bias towards 0.
Case 2. Suppose instead that the adversary A′ aims to bias the outcome towards 1. We
apply the Minimax Theorem to a zero-sum game where player 1 chooses the messages r′1, . . . , r
′
s
and player 2 chooses the messages r′′1 , . . . , r
′′
s , and player 1 “wins” if the protocol outcome is 0, and
player 2 wins otherwise. By the Minimax Theorem,
Π′n(r1, . . . , rn) = max
r′′
1
,...,r′′s
min
r′
1
,...,r′s
Πn+2s
(
r1, . . . , rn, r
′
1, . . . , r
′
s, r
′′
1 , . . . , r
′′
s
)
.
Given this new and equivalent definition of Π′n, we can apply exactly the same argument struc-
ture as that given for Case 1 above, to deduce that
• There is a constant 0 < ε′ < 1 such that PrΠn+2s,A(0) = 1−PrΠn+2s,A(1) = ε′ for any adaptive
A performing up to 2s corruptions, and hence there is a non-empty set
R0
def
= {(r1, . . . , rn) : ∀rˆ1, . . . , rˆ2s, Πn+2s(r1, . . . , rn, rˆ1, . . . , rˆ2s) = 0} , and
• by the adaptive security of Πn+2s, the messages of honest players will fall in R0 with proba-
bility at least ε′, and
• if the honest players’ messages fall in R0, then the outcome of Π′n is equal to 0, even in the
presence of a strong adaptive adversary corrupting s players and aiming to bias towards 1.
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We have established that both outcomes 0 and 1 occur with constant probability in Π′n, even in
the presence of an arbitrary strong adaptive adversary corrupting up to s players. Therefore, Π′n
is secure against s = t/2 corruptions.
4 Conclusion
We have introduced a new adversarial model for multi-party protocols and an associated security
notion, strong adaptive security. We have made use of a novel and widely applicable technique
for reducing the amount of communication in a protocol, to show that any one-round strongly
adaptively secure coin-flipping protocol can tolerate at most O˜(
√
n) corruptions. We believe that
this work paves the way to a number of little-explored research directions. We highlight some
interesting questions for future work:
• To study the extent to which communication can be reduced in protocols in general, and
to extend our communication-reduction techniques to the settings of multi-round protocols
and/or adaptive security.
• To apply the strong adaptive security notion in the context of other types of protocols and
settings, and to design protocols secure in the presence of strong adaptive adversaries.
• To consider whether adaptively secure asymmetric coin-flipping protocols can be converted to
adaptively secure symmetric protocols, in general. This is not known even for the one-round
case, and the question is moreover of interest since there are known one-round protocols which
are not symmetric.
• To extend this work to prove (or disprove) the long-open conjecture of Lichtenstein et al.
[LLS89] that any adaptively secure coin-flipping protocol can tolerate at most O(
√
n) cor-
ruptions.
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